WASHINGTON, DC December 11th

In recent days, national reporting has described a sweeping overhaul of United States border-screening procedures; these reports assert that foreign visitors will soon be required to provide extensive biometric data, mandatory selfie uploads, five years of social-media history, ten years of communication information, and the exclusive use of a mobile-only ESTA system. Because these assertions have circulated widely and because they imply a dramatic shift in federal screening practices, we examined every available first-hand federal source to determine what has been formally proposed, what has been authorized previously, and what details cannot be confirmed anywhere in the public record. This review draws solely from primary federal documents: EXECUTIVE ORDER 14161, CBP’s Voluntary Self-Reported Exit Program filings in the FEDERAL REGISTER, and OMB paperwork filings relating to ESTA and the I-94 Arrival and Departure Record system; it also considers the absence of specific details in any of these documents, which directly affects the factual standing of several claims now circulating in secondary reporting.

Several news articles chose to present an account in which the Department of Homeland Security intends to require a broad array of new data fields from foreign travelers; those articles describe mandatory selfie uploads for all visa-waiver visitors, a requirement to disclose every social-media account used in the past five years, ten years of email addresses and phone numbers, the submission of IP-address history, and even potential DNA or iris-scan collection “when feasible.” One report further states that CBP intends to eliminate the ESTA website entirely and replace it with a mobile-only platform. Because the scope of these claims is substantial, and because the reported details would significantly transform the experience of millions of visitors, it is essential to examine whether those assertions appear anywhere in the first-hand federal sources that govern the rulemaking process. When those documents are reviewed carefully, a different picture emerges; some elements being described are indeed grounded in existing federal authority, while others do not appear in any published federal document and therefore cannot be presented as established requirements.

The first area where the federal record provides clarity concerns CBP’s Voluntary Self-Reported Exit Program: the FEDERAL REGISTER contains filings in which CBP describes a mobile-app system that allows certain foreign nationals to confirm their departure from the United States by submitting passport information, a live facial image captured at the time of departure, and device geolocation. This program is not compulsory; its stated purpose is to improve the accuracy of departure records and reduce long-standing gaps in the tracking of visitors who exit the United States. Because this program already exists in published form, it is unsurprising that some recent reporting blended these established procedures with unconfirmed descriptions of new, far broader biometric requirements. Yet the federal filing describing the exit program does not impose across-the-board selfie submission for all ESTA applicants; it does not require mandatory geolocation for all visitors; it does not encompass DNA or iris scanning; and it does not reference a mobile-only ESTA system. Thus, while the existence of a mobile tool for confirming departures is real and documented, it cannot be used to substantiate every assertion now circulating.

A second area of federal clarity arises from EXECUTIVE ORDER 14161; the text of the order directs the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence to identify countries where information-sharing and identity-verification are insufficient for security purposes; it further directs these officials to determine what additional data may be necessary to verify identities, assess risks, and adjudicate visas or other immigration benefits. This order establishes a federal mandate to strengthen national-security screening; however, the order does not prescribe DNA collection, iris-scan collection, mobile-only application systems, five-year social-media disclosure mandates, or ten-year email or phone-number requirements. The order provides the authority for departments to review and revise vetting procedures; it does not itself establish the details that secondary reporting has recently described. For that reason, the executive order cannot serve as first-hand confirmation of those specific claims.

A third area of review concerns the OMB paperwork filings associated with OMB Control Number 1651-0111; this control number governs the data-collection requirements for the I-94 Arrival and Departure Record and for the ESTA system used by travelers from visa-waiver countries. Recent filings under this number reference the need to refine information collection to improve identity verification and align screening practices with the national-security directives contained in EXECUTIVE ORDER 14161. These filings confirm that CBP is engaged in revising its information-collection framework; however, the filings available for public viewing do not enumerate the specific data fields described in the circulating articles. They do not specify a mandate for five years of social-media identifiers; they do not specify the elimination of the ESTA website; they do not require DNA or iris data; and they do not impose universal mandatory selfie submissions for all ESTA applicants. As a result, while the filings confirm that revision is underway, they do not validate the detailed list of changes reported elsewhere.

An equally important aspect of this review is the absence of any posted federal documents that corroborate the more dramatic claims being circulated. At present, neither DHS nor CBP has published a press release announcing the elimination of the ESTA website; neither department has published a rule describing the mandatory submission of all social-media accounts used over a five-year period; neither has released a proposal requiring travelers to provide ten years of email addresses or phone numbers; and neither has posted a requirement for IP-address history, DNA samples, or iris scans as part of the standard ESTA process. No public filing in the FEDERAL REGISTER currently displays language matching these items; no publicly accessible docket includes these requirements; and no agency has published the full text of the rule that some articles cite. When a claim cannot be found in any publicly posted federal document, it cannot be presented as first-hand fact; thus, while these descriptions may reflect impressions, interviews, or interpretations, they do not appear in the present federal record.

It is also important to consider how federal rulemaking ordinarily proceeds; when the Department of Homeland Security or CBP seeks to revise ESTA or I-94 requirements, the agency must publish the proposed changes in the FEDERAL REGISTER; the publication must include the text of the proposed rule, the data-collection rationale, and the estimated burden upon applicants; the public must be invited to comment; and all comments must be preserved in the docket. In this setting, transparency is not optional; it is a statutory requirement. Any rule compelling DNA collection, iris scanning, or extensive social-media disclosure would appear in a public docket; such language cannot be enforced without public notice, nor can it be implemented without the opportunity for comment. Because no such text is presently available in the public docket, the more expansive claims circulating in recent reporting do not possess the legal standing sometimes implied by secondary descriptions.

Nevertheless, there are several areas where secondary reporting reflects genuine trends in federal policy. The United States has invested heavily in biometric verification over the past decade; the facial-comparison systems deployed at ports of entry are well-documented; the CBP One mobile application has expanded into several functions; and the Department continues to strengthen its ability to verify identity. These efforts are grounded in long-standing congressional mandates and are shaped by executive directives such as EXECUTIVE ORDER 14161. Furthermore, DHS has broad statutory authority to inspect electronic devices at the border; this authority is well-established in case law and has been used to interdict terrorism, smuggling, human-trafficking operations, and visa fraud. These elements of the present conversation are not speculative; they are well-documented in existing federal practice. Yet this fact reinforces the importance of clearly separating what is genuinely published in first-hand sources from what has been described through secondary channels.

The present review also highlights the way in which partial or incomplete information can create confusion. When a mobile exit-verification program is real and documented, when an executive order directs expanded vetting, and when OMB filings confirm revision of ESTA data-collection practices, it is easy for secondary reporting to blend these elements into a single narrative that appears authoritative but is not fully grounded in the federal record. In such cases, readers benefit from careful examination of the first-hand documents; they also benefit from clear explanations of what those documents do and do not contain. This approach preserves accuracy; it also reinforces public understanding of the rulemaking process, the limits of federal authority, and the distinction between implemented programs and proposed revisions.

For this reason, any public discussion of proposed ESTA or I-94 changes should reflect the current federal record: certain programs exist; certain authorities have been granted; certain revisions are underway; yet many of the more dramatic requirements described in secondary reporting have not been published in any federal docket. This does not mean that future proposals will not include them; it simply means that, today, they do not appear in the first-hand record that governs the public-comment process. To present an accurate account, one must therefore distinguish between existing programs, ongoing revisions, and claims that remain unsubstantiated by federal publication. When readers understand these distinctions, they are better equipped to evaluate new proposals, understand their rights, and participate meaningfully in the public-comment process that federal law preserves.

In reviewing these matters, our purpose is not to dispute motives or intentions; rather, it is to clarify what the government has actually placed in the public record. Federal rulemaking operates on transparency; that transparency exists so that the public may review the language of a proposed rule before the rule is finalized. Because several claims now circulating do not appear in any first-hand federal document, they cannot be reported as established requirements. Public understanding is best served when the distinctions among confirmed, proposed, and unconfirmed assertions are maintained; clarity depends upon careful examination of federal filings; accuracy depends upon the measured presentation of what those filings actually contain.

Readers who wish to follow the development of any future ESTA or I-94 revisions may do so by monitoring the FEDERAL REGISTER, where all DHS and CBP proposals must be published; readers may also consult the public dockets maintained by OMB for information-collection revisions tied to OMB Control Number 1651-0111. These sources will provide the authoritative text of any future proposals. Until such documents contain the elements described in recent reporting, those elements remain unconfirmed.

The Appalachian Post is an independent West Virginia news outlet dedicated to clean, verified, first-hand reporting. We do not publish rumors. We do not run speculation. Every fact we present must be supported by original documentation, official statements, or direct evidence. When secondary sources are used, we clearly identify them and never treat them as first-hand confirmation. We avoid loaded language, emotional framing, or accusatory wording, and we do not attack individuals, organizations, or other news outlets. Our role is to report only what can be verified through first-hand sources and allow readers to form their own interpretations. If we cannot confirm a claim using original evidence, we state clearly that we reviewed first-hand sources and could not find documentation confirming it. Our commitment is simple: honest reporting, transparent sourcing, and zero speculation.

Primary First-Hand Sources

  • EXECUTIVE ORDER 14161
  • FEDERAL REGISTER filings for CBP’s Voluntary Self-Reported Exit Program
  • OMB paperwork filings associated with OMB Control Number 1651-0111

Secondary Attribution-Based Sources

  • USA TODAY reporting on alleged CBP proposals
  • Additional media reporting summarizing the same claims

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